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**WEEKLY REPORT****THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

6 April 1966

**INTELLIGENCE AND REPORTING SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERAGENCY  
VIETNAM COORDINATING COMMITTEE**

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**THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM**

(31 March - 6 April 1966)

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(The Weekly Report on the Situation in South Vietnam is  
based on contributions from CIA, DIA, and INR; it is  
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
THE WEEK IN PERSPECTIVE

The political situation in South Vietnam has continued to deteriorate, particularly in I Corps, but also through the spread of demonstrations in II Corps and in Saigon itself. The Ky government is still trying to resolve the problem with action on two fronts, including possible imminent use of force to reassert its authority in Da Nang and steps to move ahead on its plans for a constitutional council in Saigon. The crisis could be approaching a climax but may well simmer on for some time.

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I. THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

A. POLITICAL SITUATION

1. The political situation has continued to deteriorate, particularly in I Corps, but is still sufficiently fluid that it could either move toward a final showdown, or continue to simmer on for some time.

2. During the past week, demonstrations continued in various towns of I Corps, with the main focus on Hue and Da Nang, and with increasing evidence of participation by local police, army troops, and civil servants. Protest activity has spread increasingly in the provincial capitals in II Corps, with disorders reported in Pleiku, Nha Trang--now under martial law, and Dalat--still in a state of tension despite the dispatch of combat police units.

3. In Saigon itself, demonstrations led by Buddhist youths have occurred almost daily this week, although police and airborne troops have kept the situation under control. On several occasions, however, tear gas and other riot techniques have been required to disperse unruly groups of demonstrators.

4. The character of the protest activity has shifted almost entirely to denunciations of the government in Saigon and of the US for alleged "political interference." On one occasion in Saigon, demonstrators reportedly were heard shouting slogans favoring Ho Chi Minh, and simultaneously attacking the moderate wing of the Buddhist hierarchy.

5. After leaving most of the burden of handling the protest campaign to local authorities such as the extremely passive officials in I Corps, the military government in Saigon now is trying to curb the unrest with a combination of carrot-and-stick tactics. This dual policy was spelled out by the top generals at a press conference on 3 April, following a convocation of the Armed Forces Congress, or supreme governing authority in the country. A communique on the congress' decisions announced that a national political convention, representing various political and religious views, would be held to hammer out a plan for transitional steps to civilian rule. At the same time,

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it was announced that "strong measures" would be used to restore order in the country, with Premier Ky making it clear, under questioning, that troops would be sent to "retake" Da Nang from "Communist hands." In a third step, Vietnamese officials acted to defend the US from charges of interference and "colonialism."

6. On 4 April, Ky began the airlift of three Vietnamese Marine battalions to Da Nang air base in apparent preparation for a move on the city. Ky himself flew to the base to take charge of the operation, but after conferences with I Corps commander General Chuan, put off any immediate move, and issued a public statement partially retracting his earlier charge that Da Nang was under Communist control. Although details of the Ky-Chuan talks are not available, Chuan has indicated publicly that he warned Ky of possible armed conflicts between the marines and I Corps units which he had brought in to defend Da Nang.

7. Although Ky returned to Saigon on 5 April, he apparently has not abandoned his determination on a show of force at Da Nang, whose mayor he has accused of fomenting agitation and of allowing Communists into the "struggle" movement leadership. Ky has arranged for the airlift to Da Nang airfield of tanks which would accompany marine elements on a move to seize key points in the city such as the municipal offices, police headquarters, and the radio station. Military Security Service chief Colonel Loan, Ky's former air force deputy, is reportedly charged at present with conducting the operation, but the timing is still in doubt.

8. Of the two South Vietnamese Army divisions normally based in I Corps the 2nd Division, headquartered at Quang Ngai city, is regarded by Saigon officials as loyal. The new 1st Division commander at Hue, General Nhuan, is an ardent Buddhist, whose troops have been active in antigovernment demonstrations. Nhuan, soon after marine units began arriving at Da Nang air base, openly declared his sympathy for the "struggle" movement, vowing to defend Hue not only against the Viet Cong but against a Saigon "takeover." He also attempted to send some units to help defend Da Nang against Ky's marines.

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Since Ky's retraction of his charges of Communist control in Da Nang, however, Nhuan has been privately declaring his quarrel with Saigon over, deploring a US decision to withdraw US advisers from the 1st Division's tactical units, and promising to send troops now in Hue back to their operational base. The ultimate loyalties of I Corps commander Chuan are still questionable, but it is clear that he has strong reservations against an operation imposing government control in Da Nang by force.

9. While the use of government troops against I Corps continues to be imminent, the government is simultaneously proceeding to press forward on a political solution in Saigon. On 6 April, preliminary sessions of the projected national political convention were begun. These followed several days of intensive private government communications with leaders of the Buddhist hierarchy, hinting at concessions in an effort to get Buddhist leaders to tone down agitation before force is required. Although the Buddhists indicate some willingness to continue a dialogue toward political compromise, their position has shown little real give. Buddhist Institute chairman Thich Tam Chau previously counseled patience to give the government time to meet its "promises," but on 5 April he told a crowd in Saigon that the national political convention was actually a step backward by Ky, and that the Buddhists were demanding an elected constituent assembly within three months. Buddhist leaders have boycotted the preliminary session of the national convention, as apparently, have representatives of both I and II Corps.

10. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the full political convention, presumably still without Buddhist and northern participants, will meet early next week and set up a constitution drafting body essentially as last envisaged by the ruling Directorate. This plan involves a council, with one-half of its membership drawn from the provincial and municipal councils elected in 1965, and one-half appointed from among leading political and religious factions. This formula has already been declared unsatisfactory by the Buddhists.

11. A conversation of Buddhist monk Tri Quang with an American observer on 6 April elicited a

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repetition of Quang's position that a political solution requires either a "constituent assembly" composed entirely of members from the local councils, or an assembly to be elected in three months. This assembly would be empowered to confirm the present government leadership--Chief of State Thieu and Premier Ky--in office, thus obviating the need for the military Directorate, as well as to draft a constitution and electoral laws. This would lead to a truly representative government, responsive to the assembly as a legislature. Quang insisted that the Buddhists had not set out to "overthrow," but rather to "strengthen," the present government, but he implied that Ky would be "finished" if he used force against central Vietnam. Quang stated that he was responsible for the antigovernment movement in I Corps, and implied that, despite the movement's anti-American overtones, he fully recognized Vietnam's need for US support.

12. There has been no question of the influence of Tri Quang and the Buddhist organization in the present antigovernment campaign. Although allegations of Viet Cong influence on or direction of Quang and other members of the Buddhist hierarchy have long been made, they cannot presently be substantiated. There is an obvious parallel between the propaganda, tactics, and organizational structure of the present "struggle movement"--a multitude of "struggle committees" representing various economic and social strata among the populace--and those of the Communists. Low-level Vietnamese security penetrations have reported considerable evidence of Viet Cong penetration particularly in Da Nang, of the "struggle committees," which draw heavily on key Communist target groups such as students, workers, and Buddhists. Whether or not the Buddhists are witting, or merely feel that they can use and contain Communist influence, their anti-government campaign obviously lends itself to possible Viet Cong exploitation.

13. There continue to be signs of strain among Saigon's ruling generals over the proper means of dealing with the present crisis. Premier Ky is taking a somewhat ambiguous position of alternately advocating both a tougher line and greater concessions

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than are deemed wise by some of his colleagues. Directorate Secretary-General Chieu, who was temporarily "seized" by antigovernment elements in Hue while on a mission to try to bring ousted I Corps commander Thi back to Saigon, feels he is now under some suspicion by the Saigon junta. Chieu tends to advocate a moderate course; he apparently now feels that Thi is the only general with the potential to bring I Corps back into the fold, provided he is not driven into open collaboration with the "struggle groups." Defense Minister Co, normally hostile to Buddhist aspirations, is now in Da Nang, where, although reported [REDACTED] to be a hostage of antigovernment elements, he is publicly proclaiming that he is working out a political solution.

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#### Economic Situation

14. At a press conference on 30 March, Minister of Economy Au Truong Thanh emphasized the GVN's duty to combat inflation and announced tax measures calculated to yield about one billion piasters in additional revenue per year. Strict collection of the automobile tax and the tax on excessive rents is expected to yield 600-700 million piasters. The conversion of the tax on restaurants and bars from a percentage of the proceeds to a flat assessment is expected to yield an estimated 400 million piasters. Thanh left open the possibility of additional taxes within the next two months. He also stated that commodity prices (particularly pork and cement) had leveled off during March, except condensed milk prices which were rising because of supply shortages. Thanh felt that strikes at the port of Da Nang threatened to increase the cost of living in that area, but the congested port conditions in Saigon would improve during the next three months because of US assistance in customs and clearance procedures.

15. Embassy Saigon believes that Thanh's tax measures will produce less than one million piasters in additional revenue and that, in any event, they will fall far short of the four billion piasters in taxes agreed on at Honolulu. Our embassy also

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believes that Thanh is overly optimistic about the stability of commodity prices. The comparative price stability of the past few weeks is largely the result of the caution and restraint by the business community, because of the anxiety and uncertainty generated by GVN economic policies. Contrary to Thanh's statement, condensed milk prices have fallen because of the arrival of PL 480 supplies.

16. Governor Hanh of the National Bank told embassy officers on 1 April that the political crisis had exacerbated the economic slowdown which was originally precipitated by the execution of the Chinese businessman, low official prices for importers, and police pressures on the business community. He confirmed, however, that the police presently have stopped checking the books of importers. Moreover, although Hanh was originally in favor of an import deposit system, he now feels that such a system would cause many importers to back away from importing. He feels that the GVN should do everything possible to encourage importers rather than place additional burdens on them. He favors an increase in official prices to permit importers to make a reasonable legal profit, even though he realizes that official prices cannot be raised for political reasons. Embassy Saigon comments that, while almost everyone agrees on the desirability of raising official prices, nobody is willing to initiate such action in view of the present state of political flux.

17. According to the USAID Index, retail prices in Saigon for the week ending 28 March were one percent above a month ago. The increase in rice prices, following the announcement by the GVN of a high purchase price for rice, was the primary factor.

18. In the Saigon free market, the prices of \$10 bills and \$10 MPC (scrip) rose by one piaster each to 166 and 115 per dollar respectively. Gold prices fell from 246 piasters per dollar to 242, thus reversing the trend of the previous two weeks. In Hong Kong, the piaster dollar cross rate, after remaining at 159 for six weeks, fell to 155.

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**B. MILITARY SITUATION**

1. The over-all level of Communist-initiated activity continued high for the week ending 2 April.

2. During the period there were 905 Communist-initiated incidents compared to the previous week's 1,064. There were eight attacks, of which one was large-scale, and 651 acts of terrorism, compared to the previously reported 15 and 671. The continued high rate of terrorism can be attributed to increased attempts to intimidate the population and stem anti-Viet Cong sentiment. Reports received indicate that the people blame the Viet Cong for the injuries sustained from increased allied artillery and air attacks. The kill ratio favored Free World forces 4.0 to 1, down from the preceding week's 4.2 to 1. A fifty-percent decrease was registered in Viet Cong casualties with 962 killed and 72 captured reported. Vietnamese casualties for the period were 155 killed, 337 wounded and 26 missing or captured--a total of 518 compared to the last period's 996. United States losses for the week were 101 killed, 690 wounded and 12 missing--a total of 803 compared to the last report of 726. Free World forces' losses decreased from 86 to 69. The South Vietnamese lost 104 weapons (two crew-served) and captured 255 (eight crew-served).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA/ CAPTURED</u>	<u>TOTAL CASUALTIES</u>
US	101	690	12	803
ARVN	155	337	26	518
THIRD COUNTRY	18	51	0	69
VIET CONG	962	---	73	1,035

**GVN/Allied Activities**

3. Friendly large-unit operations again increased with 108 recorded. Small-unit actions decreased while enemy contacts remained about the same.

4. In I Corps, Army of Vietnam (ARVN) units and elements of the 3d Marine Amphibious Force reacted to

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a Viet Cong attack in Quang Ngai Province on 28 March with Operation INDIANA/QUYET THANG 72. During the operation, which terminated on 30 March, the marines lost 11 killed and 45 wounded while inflicting losses of 69 killed, six captured, and 19 individual weapons on the Viet Cong. In Quang Nam Province, US Marines terminated Operation KINGS on 28 March. US losses in the eight-day operation were five killed and 46 wounded while Viet Cong losses were 59 killed, one captured, and 14 individual weapons. The 1st ARVN Division conducted Operation LAM SON 250 in Quang Tri Province from 27 to 30 March, during which a significant engagement took place with the Viet Cong 804th Main Force Battalion. Final results were 35 friendly killed and 80 wounded; Viet Cong losses were 58 killed, six captured and 25 individual weapons.

5. In II Corps, elements of the US 1st Cavalry Division participating in Operation LINCOLN in Pleiku Province encountered heavy resistance on 30 March. Cumulative results to date are 33 US killed, 83 US wounded, five missing, and three UH1D Iroquois helicopters destroyed. Viet Cong losses are 373 killed, seven captured, plus 79 individual and six crew-served weapons. The forces involved in US/ROK Operation FILLMORE have had a series of minor clashes with the Viet Cong. Cumulative results from the continuing search-and-destroy operation are six US killed and 37 wounded (33 US, 4 ROK). Friendly forces have inflicted losses on the Viet Cong of 115 killed, 26 captured and 26 individual weapons. The final results of Operation MANG HO V, terminated by the Capital ROK Division in Binh Dinh Province on 26 March, were 17 friendly killed and 48 wounded, while Viet Cong losses were 349 killed, 281 captured plus 27 individual and two crew-served weapons. Three operations conducted by ARVN forces (two in Binh Dinh Province, one in Kontum Province) resulted in total friendly losses of 38 killed, 64 wounded, and Viet Cong losses of 200 killed and five individual weapons.

6. In III Corps, elements of the US 25th Infantry Division conducting Operation CIRCLE PINES south of Cu Chi, Hau Nghia Province, have killed 149 Viet Cong, captured five and also 13 individual weapons and one crew-served weapon. Friendly forces have lost 32 killed and 195 wounded.

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7. There were no operations of significance in IV Corps during the week.

8. Free World forces conducted 108 battalion or larger-size operations during the week; 46 achieved contact--32 ARVN, 10 US, two ROK, and two combined. There were 19,177 small-unit operations, including 3,309 conducted by US forces. Of the 133 achieving contact, 79 were conducted by US units.

9. There were fourteen B-52 Stratofortress missions flown over South Vietnam during the week ending 3 April with ground follow-up action scheduled for only one of these missions. Post-strike photography reports on FINE SAND IV shows 73 craters inside the impact area and 27 outside.

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three mid-February strikes in Tay Ninh Province, NET TON I, II, and III, resulted in 75 to 145 Viet Cong personnel killed or wounded. In the same area a radio station reportedly was partially destroyed, a large number of barracks, several liaison stations, and the headquarters of the Viet Cong provincial commander were destroyed. During the period 25-31 March a total of 3,231 tactical air strikes and armed reconnaissance sorties were flown by the combined efforts of the US Navy, Air Force, Marine and VNAF aircraft.

10. In addition to close air support, direct air support and interdiction missions in support of ground operations, pilots reported the following damage was inflicted: 3,072 structures, 90 sampans, 29 bunkers were destroyed; 2,114 structures, 37 sampans, seven bunkers and three AW sites were damaged. In addition, there were four roads cratered, 14 caves and 22 foxholes collapsed and 41 secondary explosions were observed. A Marine F8E Crusader crashed after a bombing run south of Da Nang from an unknown cause; the pilot is listed as missing. A Navy A4E Skyhawk pilot was rescued after he ejected from his aircraft when it had a flame-out. An Air Force F-100 Supersabre was shot down by enemy ground fire southwest of Saigon. The pilot was rescued.

#### Communist Activity

11. The highest incident rate for South Vietnam during the week occurred in I Corps, with 286 reported.

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On 28 March, an unidentified Viet Cong battalion-size force attacked the positions of the 3d Battalion, 5th ARVN Regiment in Quang Ngai Province. Friendly forces lost three killed and 21 wounded. The Viet Cong lost 70 killed and eleven weapons. The district towns of Trieu Phong, Quang Tri Province, and Phu Loc, Thua Thien Province, were mortared by the Viet Cong. Special Forces units report that an unidentified 1,800-man regiment armed with antiaircraft weapons and 120-mm. mortars has infiltrated into Quang Tri Province. It has also been reported that the 118th PAVN Battalion (estimated strength 400) is located in the province area. This battalion could be part of the unidentified regiment. The presence of these units and others previously reported could cause a serious threat to the Khe Sanh Special Forces camp, the Ba Long Valley outpost, as well as other district towns and friendly units in the two northern provinces. Reported Viet Cong unit movements in other provinces indicate the possibility that five enemy regiments now may be in Quang Ngai Province.

12. Viet Cong activity decreased in II Corps during the week. Despite decreased activity, indications are that concentrated efforts will be made against friendly installations in the area. Likely targets for future attacks are the district towns of Plei Me, Duc Co, and Le Thanh in Pleiku Province. A captured Viet Cong document identified the 3d Battalion, 101st PAVN Regiment in Quang Duc Province. This is the first report since October 1965 of elements of this regiment in Quang Duc Province.

13. An estimated two-company Viet Cong force attacked Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province in III Corps. The headquarters of the 10th ARVN Regiment, the province capital and the Xuan Loc Airfield received 75-mm. recoilless rifle, 81-mm. mortar, and small-arms fire during the attack. On 28 March, the 3d Brigade, US 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, Binh Duong Province, received 10 rounds of mortar fire later identified [redacted] as 4.2 inch. This is the first confirmed instance of the Viet Cong employing 4.2 inch mortars in III Corps. The Viet Cong captured two 4.2 inch mortars in Quang Ngai Province in October 1964 and two in Dinh Province in December 1964. In the Capital Military

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Region, Viet Cong terrorists attacked the Victoria Bachelor Officers' Quarters in Saigon. The terrorists drove an explosive-laden truck to within 15 feet of the entrance, killed the guards and detonated the explosives. The explosion caused six deaths (3 US, 3 VN) and 116 wounded (107 US, 3 AUS, 6 VN). The lower three floors of the structure were heavily damaged while the remaining floors and an adjacent building sustained moderate damage. It is believed that one Viet Cong was killed in the attack. Two suspects have been detained.

14. Acts of terror increased in IV Corps during the week with 234 reported. This increase can be attributed to stepped-up tax collection efforts by the Viet Cong. As a result of attacks by Viet Cong forces of unidentified size on two posts in Bac Lieu and Kien Phong provinces, ARVN forces suffered losses of 12 killed, 20 wounded, 17 missing, and 43 weapons. The Viet Cong lost two killed and one weapon.

15. National Route 1 is closed south of Mo Duc in Quang Ngai Province; and in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Binh Tuy, and Long Khanh provinces. Route 14 is closed north of Dak To in Kontum Province; in Pleiku Province south of Pleiku City; and in Darlac, Quang Duc, Phuoc Long, and Binh Long provinces. Route 9 is closed in Quang Tri Province. Route 4 is closed in Vinh Long Province.

16. The National Railroad is operating between Saigon and Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province; between Ca Na, Ninh Thuan Province and Ninh Hoa, Khanh Hoa Province; between Dalat in Tuyen Duc Province and Phan Rang, Ninh Thuan Province.

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### C. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

1. In the opinion of US Mission officials approximately 90 percent of the population is not involved with and is not sympathetic toward the political power struggle between the ruling military elite and the influential clerical elite. This apathy toward the civilian-military struggle movement is the result of the popular view that the parties, with which the individual Vietnamese does not identify, are dealing with an issue, civilian constitutionalism, which is too abstract for him to perceive. Even though the struggle has been cast in the name of the people and their right to self-determination, the populace has been inculcated with "attentisme" (a wait-and-see attitude) for too many centuries to identify actively with the major pressure groups.

2. An objective of the revolutionary development program is to gradually involve accessible portions of this 90 percent of the population with the government's programs so that the individual can perceive the issues and rationally support a government which is acting on its behalf. Nearly three million of the country's 16 million people live in urban, GVN-controlled areas, which means that approximately 80 percent of the population is rural. About 85 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture as a means of living.

3. In February, the chiefs of An Giang and Chau Doc provinces were replaced. Both provinces are heavily influenced by the Hoa Hao religious sect. The changes thwarted moves to extend this influence in the delta. The An Giang Province chief, Colonel Tran Van Tuoi, who had successfully led the effort to make the province the most secure in the country, has not been reassigned. Former Chau Doc Province chief, Colonel Ly Ba Pham, who is a Hoa Hao, will run An Giang. It is now a National Priority Area for Revolutionary Development and receives the largest provincial budget. Colonel Pham reportedly will continue the emphasis on construction and development but will be less solicitous of the all Hoa Hao provincial council which is irritated by Pham's decision to exclude it from participation in the province's revolutionary program.

4. Provincial requests for revolutionary development funds are being rapidly approved and the level of

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expenditures is running approximately one million Vietnamese piasters (US \$10,000) per day more than that expended during the comparable period in 1965. Instructor training at the National Cadre Center in Vung Tau has met with a setback. Only 70 of the necessary 150 specialist instructors (for Civil Affairs, Census-Grievance, and New Life Development) have been obtained for training. The lack of qualified instructors will have its greatest effect on the second class of trainees scheduled to begin at mid-year. This class is intended to provide for 3,200 specialist cadre.


5. Returnees (Chieu Hoi). With 27 of 43 provinces reporting, 323 returnees presented themselves to Chieu Hoi centers during the week which began on 19 March. In toto, 1,724 military and political Viet Cong have rallied during the first 25 days of March. The figure is approximately comparable to the record February period.

6. Refugees. On 26 March, a Viet Cong platoon entered a refugee camp in Quang Ngai Province and harangued the 1,655 inhabitants to return to their native villages. When the refugees refused, the Viet Cong tried to destroy the 150 houses there. Four hundred of the villagers whose houses were destroyed fled to the district headquarters, where they were supplied with emergency rations and were promised help to rebuild their homes.

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## II. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BLOC

1. Speeches by the heads of the North Vietnamese and Liberation Front delegations at the Soviet party congress this week reflected the Vietnamese Communist efforts to maintain their middle position in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

2. North Vietnamese party First Secretary Le Duan's speech to the Congress appeared to be a clear-cut reaffirmation of basic North Vietnamese policy--to push ahead with the war in Vietnam and to garner support from both the Soviet and Chinese Communist camps. Le Duan devoted much of his speech to the war in Vietnam, stressing Hanoi's determination to pursue the war, expressing gratitude for the past help of all Communists, and urging even more aid for Hanoi. His expressions of gratitude to the Soviet Union will undoubtedly sit poorly with Peking, as will his praise of the Soviets as "the reliable bulwark of exploited peoples throughout the world in the struggle against the forces of international reaction." Peking is unlikely, however, to view Le Duan's performance at the Moscow conference as cause to change its basic policy of support for Hanoi in the war.

3. The Le Duan speech was undoubtedly intended to make it clear that Hanoi has refused to follow Peking down the path toward a complete break with Moscow. On balance, the speech was a tactical victory for Moscow over the Chinese, but the Soviet leadership was made aware once again that Hanoi's willingness at present to give Moscow its due is based mainly on its need for continued Soviet aid in the war. Le Duan emphasized that Hanoi continues to believe, as does Peking, that the war can and should be pushed to eventual victory despite the threat of larger US intervention in the conflict.

4. The speech of the South Vietnam Liberation Front delegate, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, offered the themes of Communist determination to carry on the war, and gratitude for Soviet aid as expressed by Le Duan. She summed up the Front's adamant stand on the subject of a political settlement of the war by insisting that the US must withdraw from South Vietnam, recognize the Front, and "recognize the fundamental rights of the South Vietnamese people as defined by the Geneva agreements."

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### III. THIRD COUNTRY DEVELOPMENTS

#### A. REPUBLIC OF KOREA

1. On 2 April, according to Seoul press reports, South Vietnamese Minister of Economy and Finance Au Truong Thanh arrived in Seoul for a four-day visit to discuss trade matters between the two countries.

#### B. LAOS-NORTH VIETNAM

1. During an interview to Vietnam Press on 1 April regarding the current Laos situation, GVN Foreign Minister Tran Van Do stated that the presence of North Vietnamese troops in Laos constituted an obvious case of massive aggression as well as a constant threat to the peaceful solution of the Vietnam problem. Do added that Laotian developments showed that Hanoi regarded the concept of a coalition government as nothing more than a Trojan Horse device of obtaining power through ostensibly legal means.

#### C. THIRD COUNTRY AID

1. West Germany. A twelve-member German delegation headed by Ambassador-at-large Schmidt-Horix visited Saigon from 17 to 30 March to discuss with the GVN and the US mission plans for major increases in German aid to Vietnam. The delegation signed an agreement with the GVN to station the 3,000-ton hospital ship Helgoland in Saigon harbor. (The ship is expected to arrive in late June.) The West German group also reviewed a number of other specific German aid projects and considered ways to expedite them.

2. Republic of Korea. General Chang-kuk, chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, flew to Saigon on 5 April for a ten-day visit to discuss the despatch of an additional 20,000 ROK troops to South Vietnam. Although the opposition parties have recently reiterated their opposition to more troops because of the current political crisis in Vietnam, the minister of national defense told the National Assembly that the troops will go as scheduled.

-15-

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
## SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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
WEEKLY REPORT

26 MARCH-2 APRIL 1966


## Viet Cong Incidents



## Viet Cong Attacks



## Weapons Losses





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# SOUTH VIETNAM BATTLE STATISTICS

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## Total Personnel Losses

(Killed in Action, Captured or Missing in Action, excluding Wounded in Action)



## Total Friendly Forces Personnel Losses (US/GVN/Other Free World)

61758

Killed in action
  Missing or Captured in action
  Wounded in action

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